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Abstract
Australia’s high per capita emissions rates
makes it is a major emitter of anthropogenic
greenhouse gases, but its low intrinsic growth
rate means that future increases in population
size will be dictated by net overseas immigra-
tion. We constructed matrix models and
projected the population to 2100 under six dif-
ferent immigration scenarios. A constant 1 per
cent proportional immigration scenario would
result in 53 million people by 2100, producing
30.7 Gt CO2-e over that interval. Zero net im-
migration would achieve approximate popula-
tion stability by mid-century and produce 24.1
Gt CO2-e. Achieving a 27 per cent reduction in
annual emissions by 2030 would require a 1.5-
to 2.0-fold reduction in per-capita emissions;
an 80 per cent reduction by 2050 would re-
quire a 5.8- to 10.2-fold reduction. Australia’s
capacity to limit its future emissions will there-
fore depend primarily on a massive technolog-
ical transformation of its energy sector, but
business-as-usual immigration rates will make
achieving meaningful mid-century targets
more difﬁcult.
Key words: demography, fertility, dependency
ratio, emissions, climate change
1. Introduction
Australia is the world’s sixth-largest country
(land area=7.69 million km2), yet it has a
2014 human population of only 23.5 million,
making it the 51st largest national population
in the world (worldbank.org), or approxi-
mately 0.3 per cent of the planet’s total human
population. Despite this relatively small popu-
lation, Australia has one of the highest
per capita greenhouse gas emissions rates in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, because of its heavy
reliance on coal-ﬁred and gas-ﬁred electricity
generation, an expansive fossil-fuelled transport
network, and large agricultural sector
(International Energy Agency 2014). Australia
is also a major producer of fossil fuels, having
exported approximately 11,600petajoules
(PJ) of primary energy in 2013, of which ~80
per cent was coal and ~10 per cent was natural
gas (abs.gov.au). When combusted, this
equates to approximately 1.3 per cent of the
world’s total anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions (Brook 2012a).
In 2007, Australia committed to reducing its
greenhouse gas emissions by ratifying the
Kyoto Protocol (United Nations 1998) and
signing the second commitment period
(2013–2020) (Bradshaw et al. 2013).
Australia’s current pledge is to reduce its
emissions by 5 per cent of its year 2000
National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (NGGI)
total by 2020 (dfat.gov.au). In the Clean
Energy Act 2011, the government of the day
had set a reduction target of 80 per cent of
2000 emissions by 2050, but that was repealed
(Commonwealth of Australia 2011). Since
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then, a 26 to 28 per cent reduction below 2005
emissions (equivalent to 21 to 23 per cent be-
low 2000 emissions) by 2030 has been set
(Australian Government 2015). After 2030,
Australia’s ofﬁcial commitment is still
undecided. How Australia will manage to
achieve the 2030 target, and any longer-term
goals such as an 80 per cent reduction by
2050 has been the subject of many studies,
mainly focused on increasing efﬁciency
and penetration of renewable electricity
generation (Beyond Zero Emissions 2010;
Seligman 2010; Elliston et al. 2012; Palmer
2012; Trainer 2012; Australian Energy
Market Operator 2013; Denis et al. 2014);
however, few have considered the direct
impact of an increasing Australian population
on meeting these targets (although see
Brook 2012a).
As a wealthy nation (that is, world’s
sixth-highest per capita gross domestic
product=US$67,463; worldbank.org),
Australia’s demography is typical of economi-
cally developed nations in that its intrinsic fer-
tility is below replacement (average number of
children born to a woman who survives to the
end of her reproductive life=1.78; replace-
ment =2.1) (CIA World Factbook 2011). As
such, its current population growth is dictated
mainly by net overseas migration (Turton &
Hamilton 1999). Accumulated greenhouse
gas emissions are strongly related to popula-
tion size (Shi 2003), so it stands to reason that
any policies to reduce national emissions
should also incorporate population projections
in their assessments. However, a critical over-
view of the contribution of population growth
to achieving both its short-term and longer-
term emissions-reduction targets is lacking or
obsolete (Foran & Poldy 2002).
We address this gap by producing a compre-
hensive demographic model of the Australian
population with projections to 2100, assuming
various rates of future net overseas immigra-
tion. Based on these projections, we forecast
business-as-usual and zero-immigration
emissions trajectories to calculate the per capita
reductions required to meet the 2020
emissions-reduction target (5 per cent), the
median 2030 target (27 per cent reduction of
2005 emissions) and a putative 2050 target of
an 80 per cent reduction (from 2000). We
ask broadly how effective population policies
can be in mitigating Australia’s future
greenhouse gas emissions (both cumulative
outcomes and annual rates), and explore
the sensitivity of this conclusion to net
immigration policy. We also quantify the
major economic outcomes—in terms of child,
aged and health care costs—of the changing




We obtained life table data (age-speciﬁc
mortalities and fertility from 0 to 100+years
of age) for the Australian population from the
Australian Bureau of Statistics <http//:www.
abs.gov.au>. We converted the aggregated
5-year age class births per 1000 women into
age-speciﬁc fertilities (mx) by dividing the
5-year classes equally among their constituent
years and accounting for breeding female
mortality within each of the 5-year classes
(Bradshaw & Brook 2014). The Australian
Bureau of Statistics also provides age-speciﬁc
(x) yearly population estimates (nx) from
1971 to 2014. These estimates are obtained
by adding to the estimated population at the
beginning of each census period the compo-
nents of natural increase and net overseas
migration (www.abs.gov.au). All age-speciﬁc
population size, mortality and fertility data we
derived are available online at DOI:10.4227/
05/55679E714245D.
2.2. Leslie Matrix
We deﬁned a pre-breeding, 100 (i) × 100 (j)
element, Leslie projection matrix (M) for
women only, multiplying the subsequent
population vector by the 2014 stage-speciﬁc
sex ratio to estimate total population size at
each forecast time step (Bradshaw & Brook
2014). Fertilities (mx) occupied the ﬁrst row
of the matrix (ages 15–49years), survival
probabilities (1Mx) were applied to the sub-
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diagonal, and the ﬁnal diagonal transition
probability (Mi,j) represented survival of the
100+ stage. Complete R code (R Core Team
2014) for the scenario projections is available
from the authors upon request.
2.3. Immigration
We obtained net overseas migration data from
2004 to 2013 for women and men and their
5-year age class structure from the Australian
Bureau of Statistics. We applied the average
age structure to a migration vector constructed
for each of the migration scenarios (Figure S1
and see following discussion) and added this
to the population vector for each yearly
iteration of the projections.
2.4. Projection Scenarios
For each projection, we multiplied the Nx
vector by M for 86 yearly time steps (2014 to
2100). All projections were deterministic.
We applied a broad range of immigration
scenarios to examine the effects of various
immigration policies on long-term population
change and their associated emissions proﬁles
(compared with Turton & Hamilton 1999;
Foran & Poldy 2002) (Table 1). Scenario 1
was a business-as-usual projection with all
matrix elements (that is, demographic rates)
kept constant at 2014 values and with the
average immigration (215,000year1; Section 3)
added to the nx vector at each time step (in
reality, we randomly sampled immigration
from the yearly values between 2003 and
2014 for each time step, which approximates
adding the average, but more realistically
incorporates year-to-year variability in immi-
gration rates.) Scenario 2 was identical to
scenario 1 except that we held immigration at
a constant proportion of total population size
(1 per cent; Section 3). Scenario 3 was as
scenario 1 except that we increased the immi-
gration rate linearly such that it became twice
the average by 2100 (again, randomly
sampling from 2003 to 2014 and applying a
linearly increasing multiplication factor). This
scenario is an arbitrary immigration scenario
where immigration doubles in response to an
increasing number of environmental refugees,
for example. Scenario 4 simulated a zero-
immigration policy (no net overseas migra-
tion), whereas Scenarios 5 and 6 simulated
ﬁxed annual net immigration at 20,000 and
100,000, respectively (Table 1).
It is arguably unrealistic to assume that the
demographic rates (survival, fertility) would
remain stable from 2014 to 2100 especially
noting recent trends. We therefore repeated
all scenarios assuming a continuous (linear)
increase in average age of (female) breeding
(increasing average age of primiparity) by allo-
cating 50 per cent of the fertility in the youn-
gest reproductive age class (15–24years)
evenly across the older breeding classes
(25–49years), following a linear change func-
tion from 2014 to 2100 (Bradshaw & Brook
2014) (Table 1). According to the Australian
Treasury’s 2015 Intergenerational Report
(Commonwealth of Australia 2015a), life
expectancy is predicted to increase from 93.6
to 96.6 years for woman from 2015 to 2055.
This represents a 3.2 per cent increase in
average survival, so we also conservatively
estimated a 3.2 per cent reduction in mortality
across all age classes achieved linearly by
2100 (Table 1).
2.5. Dependency
For all scenario-based projections, we
calculated the yearly total population size (fe-
males and males; male n calculated as the
stage-dependent sex ratio [males : females]
multiplied by the female n vector) and the
proportion of the population<15 or>65years
old. The proportion in the 15- to 65-year
classes relative to the remainder represents
the ‘dependency ratio’, which is a metric of
the population generally considered to be
dependent on the productivity of employed
society (Bongaarts 2009; Kwok et al. 2013).
The dependency ratio is only a crude
measure of the potential costs to society
because it assumes that the different compo-
nents (for example, <15- and >65-year
classes) impart the same costs. In reality,
different age classes have different ‘costs’ to
‘economically productive’ society. For
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Australia, research commissioned by the
Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support for
the House of Representatives Committee on
Family and Community Affairs estimated the
derived costs of children in 2007 based on 10
subcomponents: housing, energy, food,
clothing and footwear, household goods and
services, child care, health services, transport,
leisure and personal care (Henman et al.
2007). While costs vary among living
standards, household types, age of the child,
number of children in the family and labour
force status of the primary carer, the average
was approximately A$8500 child1 year1
(Henman et al. 2007). To estimate the per
capita cost of aged care, we used the ~1
per cent of the 2014–15 gross domestic
product spent on government-funded aged
care (0.01×A$1.56×1012=A$1.56×1010)
(Commonwealth of Australia 2015a). In that
year, there was an estimation of 3,221,185
Australians aged >65years, which equates to
a cost of A$4843 per ‘aged’ person.
Similarly, a rapidly inﬂating cost of health
care is a commonly argued outcome of an
ageing society (Productivity Commission
2005; Armstrong et al. 2007; Commonwealth
of Australia 2015a; Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare 2016), despite evidence
to the contrary from Australia (Coory 2004)
and elsewhere (Getzen 1992; Reinhardt
2003). We therefore obtained per capita health
care costs (2008–09) for 10 ﬁve-year age
groups (0–4, 5–9 … 85+years) from the
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
(Figure 3.1 in Australian Institute of Health
and Welfare 2016) and isolated the
‘dependent’ component of the health care
costs as earlier for all projections.
Assuming that the per capita ‘costs’ of
children <15 and adults >65years old do
not change in terms of the proportion of the
Table 1 Summary Parameters of Population Projection Scenarios (Scenarios 1–6, Main Text; Scenarios 7–12,
Supporting Information)
Scenario Demographic rates Net immigration rate
Projected population
in 2100 (millions)
1 All constant (2014 values) Randomly sampled between 2003 and
2014 values (mean = 215,000 year1)
52.9
2 All constant (2014 values) 1% total population year1 87.1
3 All constant (2014 values) As scenario 1, but increasing
linearly to twice mean by 2100
68.1
4 All constant (2014 values) No net immigration 23.4
5 All constant (2014 values) 20,000 year1 26.2
6 All constant (2014 values) 100,000 year1 37.1
7 Linear increase in ♀ age at primiparity
to 2100; 3.2% reduction in mortality
by 2100; others constant at 2014 values
Randomly sampled between 2003 and
2014 values (mean = 215,000 year1)
53.1
8 Linear increase in ♀ age at primiparity to
2100; 3.2% reduction in mortality by
2100; others constant at 2014 values
1% total population year1 87.6
9 Linear increase in ♀ age at primiparity to
2100; 3.2% reduction in mortality by
2100; others constant at 2014 values
As scenario 1, but increasing
linearly to twice mean by 2100
67.6
10 Linear increase in ♀ age at primiparity to
2100; 3.2% reduction in mortality by
2100; others constant at 2014 values
No net immigration 23.5
11 Linear increase in ♀ age at primiparity to
2100; 3.2% reduction in mortality by
2100; others constant at 2014 values
20,000 year1 26.2
12 Linear increase in ♀ age at primiparity to
2100; 3.2% reduction in mortality by
2100; others constant at 2014 values
100,000 year1 37.2
See Section 2 for more details.
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gross domestic product, the ratio of the total
costs (child, aged and health care) of these
age groups relative to the per capita gross
domestic product should remain invariant over
the projection interval. Australia’s per capita
gross domestic product in 2014 was A
$66,409 per person with an estimated popula-
tion of 23,490,736 in that same year.
2.6. Emissions
We sourced Australia’s annual NGGI
emissions data from the National Greenhouse
Emissions Information System <http//:ageis.
climatechange.gov.au> from 1990 to 2012.
These represent the national accounting data
for the Kyoto targets to 2020 and 2050. How-
ever, the NGGI includes emissions only from
energy (fuel combustion and fugitive emis-
sions from fuels), industrial processes (mineral
products, chemical industry, metal production
etc.), agriculture (enteric fermentation from ru-
minant animals, manuremanagement, fertilizer
use, prescribed burning etc.) and waste (solid
waste disposal, wastewater handling etc.) for
all years. Emissions from land use change
and forestry (Land Use, Land Use Change
and Forestry—LULUCF) data from the Na-
tional Greenhouse Emissions Information Sys-
tems are only available for 1990 and 2008
onwards (that is, land use change in the base
year (1990) and deforestation, afforestation
and reforestation during the ﬁrst commitment
period (2008–2012)). We therefore sourced
the LULUCF net emissions (that is, not seques-
tration—this is only available as a relative
value from the 1990 baseline) from the Austra-
lian LULUCF Emissions Projections to 2030
report (Commonwealth of Australia 2013).
Using the per capita total (NGGI
+LULUCF) emissions for 2012, we projected
the emissions to 2030 and again to 2050 (under
the assumption of ‘freezing’ technology and
structural change that underpin emissions),
for two of the population scenarios listed
earlier: (i) scenario 2: constant proportional (1
per cent) immigration, and (ii) scenario 4: zero
net overseas migration. We then tallied the to-
tal emissions produced from 2015 to 2030
and again from 2015 to 2050 (that is, summing
over all projected years) for each projection
scenario and target. We then estimated the
reduction in per capita emissions (from un-
speciﬁed actions) required to meet the 2030
and 2050 targets under the various emissions
scenarios, using (a) only the NGGI values
and (b) the NGGI+LULUCF values.
When people move permanently to
Australia from elsewhere, their average
emissions in their country of origin should
ideally be subtracted from the new, average
emissions they will produce once living in
Australia. This difference therefore represents
the net emissions the growingAustralian popu-
lation will contribute to the world carbon bud-
get (Turton & Hamilton 1999). While ideally,
the country of origin for each net overseas mi-
grant each year would provide a better approx-
imation of the net global emissions from
Australia, these data were not available. We
did, however, have access to the Australian res-
idents’ region of birth (excluding Australia)
from 2000 to 2010 (excluding 2001–2004)
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. These
data included the percentage of residents born
in Oceania, North-West Europe, Southern and
Eastern Europe, North Africa and Middle East,
South-East Asia, North-East Asia, Southern
and Central Asia, Americas and Sub-Saharan
Africa from 2000 to 2010. The interannual var-
iation in these percentages was small (average
coefﬁcient of variation=9.2 per cent), so we
took the mean proportion across years for each
region as an index of the region of origin for
annual net overseas migrants.
For each of these regions, we sourced the per
capita emissions of their constituent countries
(see Table 2 for full country listing) from the
World Bank (2010 estimates, worldbank.org)
and took their population-weighted (that is,
by country) average per capita emissions as
the regional average. We then multiplied the
weighted-average immigrant proportion by
the regional per capita emissions rate and
summed them over all source regions to pro-
vide an immigration-weighted ‘average’ per
capita emissions rate (year1) for an immigrant
prior to arriving in Australia (Table 2). Multi-
plying this value by the number of annual net
overseas migrants for each scenario projection,
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we subtracted this product from the total
emissions estimated for each projection
scenario to determine net Australian emissions
(Section 3).
Finally, emissions calculations and targets
typically include only those produced within
national jurisdictions and exclude any exported
potential emissions (for example, exported fos-
sil fuels, typically called ‘Scope 3’ emissions)
(Centre for Integrated Sustainability Analysis
2008). Australia is a major producer of coal
and gas, exporting over 11,500PJ of fossil fuel
energy in 2013 alone (Australian Bureau of
Statistics). To compare the net national emis-
sions with those arising from exported fossil
fuels, we also compiled the fossil fuel exports
(in PJ) from 1990 to 2013 (excluding 1993
and 2007) from the Australian Bureau of
Statistics for the major fossil fuel exports:
bituminous (black) coal, natural gas, liquid
petroleum gas, and crude oil and feedstocks.
These four types represented between 98.7
and 98.9 per cent of the total fossil fuel energy
exported between 2009 and 2013. For each
source, we estimated the CO2-e emissions
arising from the CO2, CH4 and N2O compo-
nents using the fuel combustion emissions
factors (Table S1) provided in the Australian
National Greenhouse Accounts Factors report
(Commonwealth of Australia 2014), and
expressed these values per capita from 1990
to 2013.
Finally, we calculated the potential emissions
avoided from the export of uranium from
Table 2 Mean Percentage of Resident Country of Birth (Excluding Australia) of Immigrants to Australia byWorld
Region from 2000 to 2010 (Excluding 2001–2004) (Source: Australia Bureau of Statistics:<Http//:abs.gov.au>). The
Per Capita Greenhouse Gas Emissions (t CO2-e person
1) are the Average Per Capita Emissions† (2010)Weighted by
the 2010 Population of the Countries Included in Each Region (ISO3 Country Codes Given in the Table footnote‡).
TheWeighted (w) Average Per Capita Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Immigrants Prior to Their Arrival in Australia
is Therefore the Sum of the Products of the Proportion Immigrating andTheir Country Population-weighted Region-
of-origin Emissions (Source: <http//:www.worldbank.org>)
Region of origin I2000-10 (%) t CO2-e person
1§ w t CO2-e person
1
Oceania¶†† 11.2 × 3.0291 = 0.3401
North-west Europe‡‡ 29.2 × 8.0309 = 2.3464
Southern and Eastern Europe§§ 16.1 × 5.6587 = 0.9105
North Africa and Middle East¶¶ 5.6 × 5.9082 = 0.3317
South-east Asia††† 12.6 × 2.0435 = 0.2584
North-east Asia‡‡‡ 9.5 × 7.0330 = 0.6707
Southern and Central Asia§§§ 7.1 × 1.6159 = 0.1151
Americas†††† 4.1 × 8.1496 = 0.3374
Sub-Saharan Africa‡‡‡‡ 4.4 × 0.8309 = 0.0366
Average (weighted average) 4.7000 (5.3468)
†Notes: Carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and themanufacture of cement (including
carbon dioxide produced during consumption of solid, liquid and gas fuels and gas ﬂaring).
‡See<http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/wits/witshelp/content/codes/country_codes.htm> for full country names of ISO3 codes.
§A population-weighted (2010 estimate) average per capita emissions over all countries included in each region of origin.
¶Excluding Australia.
††FJI, FSM, KIR, MHL, NCL, NZL, PNG, PYF, SLB, TON, VUT.
‡‡BEL,BLR,CHE,CZE,DEU,DNK,EST, FIN, FRA, FRO,GBR,GRL, IRL, ISL, LTU, LUX, LVA,NLD,NOR, POL, SWE.
§§ALB, AUT, BGR, BIH, CYP, ESP, GRC,HRV,HUN, ITA,MDA,MKD,MNE, PRT, ROU, SRB, SVK, SVN, TUR,UKR.
¶¶MAR, ARE, BHR, DJI, DZA, EGY, IRN, IRQ, ISR, JOR, KWT, LBN, LBY,MLT, OMN, PSE, QAT, SAU, SYR, TUN,
YEM.
†††BRN, IDN, KHM, LAO, MMR, MYS, PHL, SGP, THA, TLS, VNM.
‡‡‡CHN, JPN, KOR, MNG, PRK, RUS.
§§§AFG, AZE, BGD, BTN, GEO, IND, KAZ, KGZ, LKA, MDV, NPL, PAK, TJK, TKM, UZB.
††††ABW, ARG, ATG, BHS, BLZ, BMU, BOL, BRA, BRB, CAN, CHL, COL, COM, CPV, CRI, CUB, CYM, DMA,
DOM, ECU, GRD, GTM, GUY, HND, HTI, JAM, KNA, LCA, MEX, NIC, PAN, PER, PRY, SLV, SUR, TTO,
URY, USA, VCT, VEN.
‡‡‡‡BDI, BEN, BFA, BWA, CAF, CIV, CMR, COD, COG, ERI, ETH, GAB, GHA, GIN, GMB, GNB, GNQ, KEN, LSO,
MDG, MLI, MOZ, MWI, NAM, NGA, RWA, SDN, SEN, SLE, SOM, STP, TGO, TZA, UGA, ZAF, ZMB, ZWE.
254 Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies May 2016
© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies
published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University andWiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.
Australia for 2013–2014 as an ‘offset’ of the
exported fossil fuel emissions described
earlier. Our rationale was that Australia’s
exported emissions should be corrected for
the emissions avoided by the combustion of
Australia’s exported uranium. Australia
exported 2607.6PJ of uranium in 2013–
2014 (Department of Industry and Science
2015). We assumed an equivalent proportion
of fossil fuel-based exports for that year
(black coal: 0.75, brown coal: 0.04, gas:
0.16, oil: 0.05, and liquid petroleum gas:
0.01) to calculate a uranium emissions offset
based on the fuel combustion emissions fac-
tors in Table S1.
3. Results
3.1. Projection Scenarios
Assuming a constant (average) net overseas
migration of 215,000 people year1 with this
age structure and under constant demographic
rates (2014 survival and fertility), Australia’s
population would reach 36.4 million by 2050
and 52.9 million by 2100 (scenario 1,
Table 1, Figure 1). Migrants to Australia have
a weighted mean age of 25.5 years based on
the data from 2004 to 2013, and most (62 per
cent) are between the ages of 15 and 34years
(Figure S1). If net immigration remained at a
constant 1 per cent of total population size,
these ﬁgures would rise to 41.0 million by
2050 and 87.1 million by 2100 (scenario 2,
Table 1, Figure 1). Linearly doubling the
immigration rate to twice the 2014 average by
2100, Australia’s population would achieve
38.6 million by 2050 and 68.1 million by
2100 (scenario 3, Table 1, Figure 1).
To put these projections into context, a
simple estimate of the ﬁnal population size in
2100—if the population grew at the average
rate it did between 1971 and 2014 (1.36 per
cent, increasing 1.88 times)—is 75.9 million.
If the population grew at the average rate it
did between 2006 and 2014 (1.73 per cent),
then the ﬁnal population in 2100 would be
104.2 million (4.4× today’s population)
(Figure 1).
At the other extreme, under a future scenario
of zero net overseas migration from 2014
onwards, Australia’s population would rapidly
level off, peaking at 25.6 million in 2040,
followed by a slow decline to 23.4 million by
2100 (scenario 4, Table 1, Figure 1). With a
modest net overseas migration of 20,000
people year1, the total population would peak
at 26.5 million in 2052 and reach 26.2 by 2100
(that is, essentially stable) (scenario 5, Table 1,
Figure 1). Finally, an average of 100,000 net
overseas migrants per year would result in a
steady increase in total population to 37.1
million by 2100 (scenario 6, Table 1,
Figure 1). For all scenarios, assuming a rise in
life expectancy and later age of ﬁrst childbirth
in woman would alter the 2100 population
projections by <1 per cent (scenarios 7–12,
Table 1, Figure S2).
3.2. Dependency Ratios
The dependency ratio varied little (coefﬁcient
of variation of 3 to 9 per cent) under all im-
migration scenarios (Figure 2). Under a zero
net-migrant future (scenario 4), the overall
dependency ratio would ﬂuctuate between
0.48 and 0.72 (that is, 48 to 72 ‘dependants’
per 100 working adults between the ages of
16 and 64years) (Figure 2), compared with
0.48 in 2014. As the number of net overseas
migrants increases, the dependency ratio
trajectory to 2100 ﬂattens (for example, with
a constant 1 per cent immigration rate,
dependency ratio ﬂuctuates between 0.48
and 0.56.)
When the dependency ratio is expressed in
terms of ‘costs’ as outlined in
Section 2 (child, aged and health care), the ratio
is even more stable. Indeed, under the most ex-
treme zero-migration scenario (scenario 4), the
cost dependency ratio only ﬂuctuates between
0.09 and 0.13 (that is, dependants will ‘cost’
the economy between 9 and 13 per cent of
what it produces as measured by gross
domestic product) (Figure 2). As for the raw
dependency ratio, even this small variation
stabilizes further as immigration rate increases
(Figure 2).
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3.3. Emissions
Under a 1 per cent immigration policy
(constant 1 per cent overseas migrants per
year; scenario 2), Australia will emit a total
of 30.66gigatonnes (Gt) CO2-e (NGGI
+LULUCF) between 2015 and 2050,
reaching a maximum rate of 1.09 billion
tonnes (t) year1 (Gt) by 2050 (Figure 3).
After subtracting the avoided global emis-
sions in source countries as people move to
Australia, the total net emissions would be
30.60Gt CO2-e or a difference of only
0.06Gt (that is, 60 million t, representing a
net difference of 0.2 per cent) (Figure 3).
Removing all net overseas migration would
reduce cumulative emissions to 2050 by 21
per cent to 24.12Gt CO2-e (Figure 3).
Total per capita emissions (NGGI+LULUCF)
have averaged 29.6 t CO2-e person
1 between
1990 and 2012 or 25.2 t CO2-e NGGI person
1
(Figure 3). Based on NGGI emissions only,
Australia would have to achieve between 1.62
(zero immigration) and 1.95 (1 per cent immi-
gration) times reduction in per capita emissions
to meet the 2030 median target of 27 per cent
reduction on 2005 emissions, equating to an
average per capita emissions rate of between
12.5 and 15.0 t CO2-e person
1 year1 in
2030 (Figure 3). If Australia introduces an 80
per cent reduction target for 2050, there would
have to be between a 6.3 (zero immigration)
and 10.2 (1 per cent immigration) times reduc-
tion in per capita emissions, equating to an
average per capita emissions of between 2.4
and 3.9 t CO2-e person
1 year1 in 2050
(Figure 3). Including LULUCF emissions in
the calculation, the reduction would have to
be between 5.8 and 9.4 times by 2050, or 2.8
and 4.6 t CO2-e person
1 in 2050 (Figure 3).
This calculation is based on an 80 per cent
reduction in total emissions (NGGI+LULUCF)
by 2050 (that is, not just NGGI).
Expressed as a percentage reduction in per
capita emissions, under the no-migration
scenario, there would be 25.4 million people
by 2050whowould have to achieve an average
emissions rate of 3.85 t CO2-e person
1 year1
(NGGI) under an 80 per cent reduction sce-
nario. This represents a required reduction of
83.5 per cent (23.30 to 3.85 t CO2-e NGGI
person1 year1). Under the business-as-usual
scenario (scenario 1: 36.4 million people by
2050), the required reduction would be 88.4
per cent (23.30 to 2.71 t CO2-e NGGI person
1
year1).
Figure 1 Australia’s population trajectory from 1971 to 2014 (it grew 1.88 times over this period) and scenario-based
projections of its future population from 2015 to 2100. Scenario 1: business-as-usual population growth (constant
2014 age-speciﬁc vital rates) and net overseas migration (I04-13 = average of 215,000 year
1 from 2004 to 2013);
scenario 2: as scenario 1 except with constant (1 per cent of total population size) immigration (I1%); scenario 3: as
scenario 1 except with a linear increase in immigration rate to twice the average by 2100 (I(04-13) × 2); scenario 4: zero
net overseas (I0); scenario 5: ﬁxed annual net immigration of 20,000 (I20k); scenario 6: ﬁxed annual net immigration at
100,000 (I100k). Also shown as reference points are the projected ﬁnal populations at constant, a constant growth rate
observed between 1971 and 2014 (1.36 per cent, r71-14) and between 2006 and 2014 (1.73 per cent, r06-14)
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For fossil fuel export emissions not consid-
ered in any national accounts or targets,
Australia has steadily (and almost linearly)
increased its total fossil fuel exports from
3394PJ in 1990 to 11,510PJ in 2013 (increas-
ing 328.2PJyear1; Figure 4). This equates to
497.7PJ person1 in 2013. Expressed in terms
of CO2-e, this represents a rise from 289.4
megatonnes (Mt) CO2-e in 1990 to 953.1Mt
CO2-e of exported emissions in 2013 (increas-
ing 27.1Mt year1) or 17.0 to 41.2 t CO2-e
person1 over the same period (increasing
0.99 t year1; Figure 4). Based on these values,
Australia today exports around 55 per cent
more CO2-e per capita than it produces
domestically (NGGI+LULUCF). However,
the ‘saved’ emissions from uranium export in
2013–2014 amounts to 213.0Mt CO2-e or
Figure 2 Dependency ratios based on (top panel) population size (n) and (bottom panel) cost (C). The size ratio is the
sum of the number of people <15 and> 65 years old divided by the number of people between 16 and 64 years old
(n<15 + >65:n16-64) and represents the average proportion of ‘dependants’ per working adult.We calculated the yearly
size ratio for each projection scenario: I0 = zero immigration; I20k = 20,000 net overseas migrants year
1;
I100k = 100,000 net overseas migrants year
1; I04-13 = average net overseas migrants year
1 observed between 2004
and 2013 (215,000); I1%= constant proportional immigration (1 per cent of total population size year
1). The cost
ratio is the sum of the costs of children<15 (A$8500 per child), the costs of people>65 (A$4843 aged per person) and
the age-speciﬁc costs of health care (Section 2) versus the total gross domestic product of the population estimated as
constant per capita amount of A$66,409 per person
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Figure 3 Australia’s historical (1990 to 2013) and projected greenhouse gas emissions to 2030 and 2050. Top panel:
total emissions (t CO2-e) from the National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (NGGI) and Land Use, Land Use Change and
Forestry (LULUCF) sectors. Shown are the emissions from both categories separately and combined and the total
projected under constant average per capita emissions assumptions for the zero-immigration (I0) and constant pro-
portion immigration (I1%) scenarios. For each scenario, we provide the total cumulative emissions (Σ) in Gigatonnes
(Gt) and total net emissions (ΔΣ); the latter removes the emissions that would have been produced by migrants in
their countries of origin (Section 2). Also shown are the emissions targets for 2020 (5 per cent reduction of 2000 NGGI
emissions), 2030 (median 27 per cent reduction of 2005NGGI emissions) and 2050 (a putative 80 per cent reduction of
2000 NGGI emissions).Middle panel: per capita NGGI and LULUCF emissions from 1990 to 2013 (t CO2-e person
1)
and the required linear declines to achieve the 2030 target under the two immigration scenarios considered (I0, I1%).
We calculated the target as a median 27 per cent reduction in NGGI emissions only (solid lines) and NGGI
+LULUCF emissions together (dashed lines). For each immigration scenario–target combination, we provide the
times by which per capita emissions would have to decline to achieve the 2030 target (x×) and the total cumulative
emissions (Gt) from 2015 to 2030 (Σ). Bottom panel: per capita NGGI and LULUCF emissions from 1990 to 2013 (t
CO2-e person
1) and the required linear declines to achieve the 2050 target under the I0 and I1% immigration sce-
narios. We calculated the target as an 80 per cent reduction in NGGI emissions only (solid lines) and NGGI
+LULUCF emissions together (dashed lines). For each immigration scenario–target combination, we provide the
times by which per capita emissions would have to decline to achieve the 2050 target (x×) and the total cumulative
emissions (Gt) from 2015 to 2050 (Σ)
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9.1 t CO2-e person
1. Offsetting the exported
fossil fuel emissions by this amount equates
to 740.1Mt CO2-e and 32.1 CO2-e person
1
or 21 per cent more CO2-e per capita
than Australia produces domestically (NGGI
+LULUCF).
4. Discussion
It is clear from our demographic modelling and
the available data on net overseas migrants that
Australia’s future population is entirely contin-
gent on its immigration policies. This differs
from Australia’s demographic situation even
20years ago when net overseas migration
accounted for only 39 per cent of the total
population growth (Shu et al. 1996). The
current demographic state of the Australian
population is such that if all net immigration
were halted today, the population would stabi-
lize by the mid-2040s and decline only slightly
thereafter, achieving nearly the same popula-
tion size that it is today by mid-century. In fact,
a modest rate of net overseas immigration of
around 20,000 people year1 would guarantee
stability at around 26.5 million after 2050.
Given that most of the world’s countries must
grapple with controversial and complicated
Figure 4 Australia’s fossil fuel exports (bituminous coal, natural gas, liquid petroleum gas, and crude oil and feed-
stocks) and CO2-e emissions from 1990 to 2013 (data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics;<http//:abs.gov.au>).
Values are expressed in total and per capita exported energy (in petajoules, PJ) and CO2-e emissions from CO2, CH4
and N2O by-products of combusted fuels (see Table S1 for conversion factors) (Commonwealth of Australia 2014).
Lines of least-squares best ﬁts are shown for each trajectory as thin dashed lines (total energy = 328.2 × year – 650,104;
per capita energy = 12.05 × year – 23,783; total emissions= 27.06 × year – 53,590; per capita emissions = 0.9894 × year -
1,952)
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family planning policies to even achieve reduc-
tions in population growth rate (Bradshaw &
Brook 2014), let alone total population size,
Australia is in an unusual socio-political situa-
tion in this regard. While many Western Euro-
pean countries have an intrinsic demographic
proﬁle like Australia’s (that is, slightly declin-
ing populations in the absence of net
immigration) (Coleman & Rowthorn 2011;
Bradshaw & Brook 2014), the ability of those
countries to moderate net immigration is
perhaps more difﬁcult given their geopolitical
proximity to many other jurisdictions. Australia
is a large island with vigilant border controls
and so has a greater potential control over its
future immigration and, hence, its total popula-
tion size and greenhouse gas emissions. Japan
is perhaps the only other developed country
with this similar demographic, economic and
island status (Coleman & Rowthorn 2011)
(although Japan’s per capita emissions are cur-
rently about one half of Australia’s).
Whether Australians choose to limit their
future population growth is entirely another
matter. The country’s natural systems have
already suffered severe degradation of ecosys-
tems from forest loss and fragmentation
because mainly of past agricultural expansion
(Bradshaw 2012), lowered rainfall in some
areas because of deforestation (Pitman et al.
2004), increasing salinization of agricultural
land (Pannell 2001; Clarke et al. 2002;
Lambers 2003) and freshwater (Nielsen et al.
2003) systems because of deforestation, the
world’s highest mammal extinction rate
(Woinarski et al. 2015), extensive economic
and environmental problems associated with
introduced animals and weeds (Bradshaw
et al. 2007; Bradshaw et al. 2013; Gallagher
& Leishman 2014; Krull et al. 2014) and
declining health of its coral reefs (De’ath
et al. 2012; Hughes et al. 2015). In this context,
any policy that seeks an even larger Australian
population would need to be carefully focused
on how to achieve this goal sustainably, while
mitigating (and, in some situations, reversing)
these threatening processes. Given the rising
environmental damage globally from a large
and growing human population (Bradshaw &
Brook 2014), Australia has the rare option to
limit this damage by adjusting its immigration
policies accordingly.
The argument that Australia’s ageing popu-
lation will represent an increasing economic
burden to the country (Commonwealth of
Australia 2015a) is also demonstrably false,
in terms of both total dependency and cost
dependency ratios, such that it should not be
invoked as an argument to inﬂate Australia’s
population unnecessarily further. There is,
however, some argument that a too steeply
declining population (as opposed to a stable
one) would reduce the future value of the
working population with fewer young people
to replace the employed population. On the
other hand, the crude metric of dependency ra-
tios does not consider the important economic
contributions of post-employed persons and
the anticipated increase in ‘participation rates’
of older people (Commonwealth of Australia
2015a), nor do they include the essential con-
tributions to society of unpaid work involved
in child rearing (Folbre 2004). Even economic
analyses suggest that declining fertility would
increase, not decrease, Australia’s future living
standards (Booth & Tickle 2003). As such, the
notion that ageing populations will push future
societies to an economic breaking point is dif-
ﬁcult to support on the basis of population
structure alone.
Based on current population policies, the
projected growth in the Australian population
will make its already challenging future
emissions-reduction goals even more difﬁcult
to achieve. In addition to the rising pressure
of Australia’s population on its ecosystems,
the country’s future greenhouse gas emissions
are also partially tied to its immigration policy.
As immigrants adopt Australian lifestyles, they
inevitably increase their emissions by
accessing emissions-intensive electricity and
transported goods and perhaps also by becom-
ing more intensive consumers themselves. As
an example, immigrants to the USA increase
their average emissions fourfold after settle-
ment in that country (Kolankiewicz &
Camarota 2008). In Australia, average per
capita emissions from immigrants’ countries
of origin are only 42 per cent of Australia’s
(Turton & Hamilton 1999).
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Because Australia already has one of the
highest per capita emissions in the world, as
well as a massive global footprint (Bradshaw
et al. 2010) in terms of external emissions
arising from its exported fossil fuels, it has a
challenging road ahead regardless of its future
choices on migration policy. This contrasts
previous work (Turton & Hamilton 1999) stat-
ing that modifying population and immigration
policies would have large effects on Australia’s
future emissions proﬁle. With a 2020 target of
5 per cent reduction in emissions (relative to
2000), a 27 per cent reduction by 2030 (relative
to 2005) and potentially an 80 per cent
reduction by 2050, Australia has no credible
mechanisms in place to achieve these goals.
With a now-defunct carbon-pricing scheme
(Schiermeier 2014), a weak and ambiguous
renewable energy target (Roelfsema et al.
2014; Simpson & Clifton 2014), a demonstra-
bly ineffectual action plan for future emissions
reductions (Lubcke 2013; Shahiduzzaman
et al. 2015) and legal impediments to building
nuclear energy capacity (Hong et al. 2014;
Heard et al. 2015), it seems unlikely that
Australia will be able to achieve either of these
two targets without substantial policy changes
across population, energy, agriculture and
environmental sectors.
Given that Australia has less than 14years to
meet the 2030 target, and less than 34years to
meet the putative 2050 target, and that a reduc-
tion in per capita emissions of 83.5 per cent
would still be required even under the extreme
scenario of no net migration, a possible solu-
tion would be to plan a large (>40 per cent)
penetration of nuclear energy (Hong et al.
2014; Brook & Bradshaw 2015), supported
by various renewable sources, to replace its
ageing and polluting electricity generators
(International Energy Agency 2014; Heard
et al. 2015). Even with the rapid construction
of nuclear energy to replace its entire coal-ﬁred
and gas-ﬁred baseload capacity (as France
achieved >75 per cent nuclear penetration in
20years) (Hong et al. 2015), electricity produc-
tion accounts for only about 33 per cent of
Australia’s total emissions (Commonwealth
of Australia 2015b). Thus, even a complete
decarbonization of the nation’s electricity
production would not be enough to meet a
2050 target of 80 per cent reduction. Most of
the transport industry would have to be
decarbonized as well (Loftus et al. 2015),
fuelled by a mix of synthetic products from a
nuclear-derived surplus of heat and electricity
and battery electric ‘plug-in’ vehicles (Brook
2012b), and current domestic gas use would
have to be electriﬁed (Heard 2013). Massive
gains in efﬁciency might also be needed,
depending on deployment rates.
Irrespective of these challenges, any
increase in Australia’s population will make
these targets even more difﬁcult, such that a
business-as-usual projection (scenario 1)
would require a ﬁvefold greater reduction in
per capita emissions to reach a 2050 target of
80 per cent reduction compared with the zero-
immigration scenario and produce ~10 per cent
more emissions (Figure 3). More population
growth driven by immigration will hamper
Australia’s ability to meet its future climate
change mitigation commitments and worsen
its already stressed ecosystems, unless a
massive technological transformation of
Australia’s energy sector is immediately forth-
coming. This general conclusion mirrors the
sustainability issues of population at the global
scale—while reducing population size over
the next few centuries is essential for limiting
the deleterious effects of consumption on
our planet’s ecosystems, more immediate
(decadal-scale) improvements in sustainability
will need to originate from technological and
social innovation (Bradshaw & Brook 2014;
Brook & Bradshaw 2015).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Bradshaw was supported by an Australian Re-
search Council Future Fellowship grants
(FT100100200). We thank B. Heard for com-
ments and suggestions.
Author contributions
C. J.A.B. and B.W.B. conceived and
designed the models. C. J.A.B. sourced and
analyzed the data. C. J.A.B. and B.W.B.
261Bradshaw & Brook: Australia’s Population Policy Implications
© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies
published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University andWiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.
contributed the analysis tools. C. J.A.B. and
B.W.B. wrote the article.
References
Armstrong BK, Gillespie JA, Leeder SR,
Rubin GL, Russell LM (2007) Challenges
in Health and Health Care for Australia.
Medical Journal of Australia 187, 485–489.
Australian EnergyMarket Operator (2013) 100
Per Cent Renewables Study - Modelling
Outcomes. Australian Energy Market
Operator, Melbourne.
Australian Government (2015) Australia’s
2030 Emission Reduction Target. Depart-
ment of Prime Minister and Cabinet,
Canberra.
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
(2016) 25 years of Health Expenditure in
Australia. 1989–90 to 2013–14. Health
and Welfare Expenditure Series Number
56. Australian Institute of Health and
Welfare, Australian Government, Canberra.
Beyond Zero Emissions (2010) Australian
Sustainable Energy. Zero Carbon Australia
Stationary Energy Plan. Melbourne Energy
Institute, Melbourne.
Bongaarts J (2009) Human Population Growth
and the Demographic Transition. Philo-
sophical Transactions of the Royal Society,
B: Biological Sciences 364, 2985–2990.
Booth H, Tickle L (2003) The Future Aged:
New Projections of Australia’s Elderly
Population. Australasian Journal on Ageing
22, 196–202.
Bradshaw CJA (2012) Little Left to Lose:
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in
Australia since European Colonization.
Journal of Plant Ecology 5, 109–120.
Bradshaw CJA, Bowman DMJS, Bond NR
et al. (2013) Brave newGreenWorld –Con-
sequences of a Carbon Economy for the
Conservation of Australian Biodiversity. Bi-
ological Conservation 161, 71–90.
Bradshaw CJA, Brook BW (2014) Human
Population Reduction is not a Quick Fix
for Environmental Problems. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences of the
USA 111, 16610–16615.
Bradshaw CJA, Field IC, Bowman DMJS,
Haynes C, Brook BW (2007) Current and
Future Threats fromNon-indigenous Animal
Species in Northern Australia: A Spotlight
on World Heritage Area Kakadu National
Park. Wildlife Research 34, 419–436.
Bradshaw CJA, Giam X, Sodhi NS (2010)
Evaluating the Relative Environmental
Impact of Countries. PLoS ONE 5e10440.
Brook BW (2012a) Climate Change Implica-
tions of a Large Australian Population. In:
Pincus J, Hugo G (eds) A Greater Australia:
Population, Policies and Governance, pp.
98–106. CEDA – the Committee for
Economic Development of Australia,
Melbourne.
Brook BW (2012b) Could Nuclear Fission
Energy, etc., Solve the Greenhouse Prob-
lem? The Afﬁrmative Case. Energy Policy
42, 4–8.
Brook BW, Bradshaw CJA (2015) Key Role
for Nuclear Energy in Global Biodiversity
Conservation. Conservation Biology 29,
702–712.
Centre for Integrated Sustainability Analysis
(2008) Dealing with Scope 3. University of
Sydney, Centre for Integrated Sustainability
Analysis, Sydney, NSW, Australia.
CIA World Factbook (2011) Australia
Economy. In: CIA World Factbook. Central
Intelligence Agency, Ofﬁce of Public Af-
fairs, Washington, DC, USA.
Clarke CJ, George RJ, Bell RW, Hatton TJ
(2002) Dryland Salinity in South-western
Australia: Its Origins, Remedies, and Future
Research Directions. Soil Research 40,
93–113.
Coleman D, Rowthorn R (2011) Who’s Afraid
of Population Decline? A Critical Examina-
tion of its Consequences. Population and
Development Review 37, 217–248.
Commonwealth of Australia (2011) Clean
Energy Act 2011. C2011A00131.
Commonwealth of Australia (2013) Australian
National Greenhouse Accounts. Australian
Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry
Emissions Projections to 2030. Department
of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change,
Science, Research and Tertiary Education,
Canberra.
262 Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies May 2016
© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies
published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University andWiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.
Commonwealth of Australia (2014) National
Greenhouse Accounts Factors. Australian
National Greenhouse Accounts. Department
of Environment, Canberra.
Commonwealth of Australia (2015a) 2015
Intergenerational Report. Australia in 2055.
Treasury of Australia, Canberra.
Commonwealth of Australia (2015b) Quarterly
Update of Australia’s National Greenhouse
Gas Inventory: September 2014. Australia’s
National Greenhouse Accounts. Department
of Environment, Canberra.
Coory MD (2004) Ageing and Healthcare
Costs in Australia: A Case of Policy-based
Evidence? Medical Journal of Australia
180, 581–583.
De’ath G, Fabricius KE, Sweatman H,
Puotinen M (2012) The 27-year Decline of
Coral Cover on the Great Barrier Reef and
Its Causes. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the USA 109,
17995–17999.
Denis A, Graham P, Hattﬁeld-Dodds S et al.
(2014) Pathways to Deep Decarbonisation
in 2050: How Australia Can Prosper in a
Low Carbon World. ClimateWorks Austra-
lia, Australian National University, CSIRO,
Victoria University, Melbourne.
Department of Industry and Science (2015)
2015 Australian Energy Update. Ofﬁce of
the Chief Economist, Department of Indus-
try and Science, Canberra.
Elliston B, Diesendorf M, MacGill I (2012)
Simulations of Scenarios with 100%
Renewable Electricity in the Australian
National Electricity Market. Energy Policy
45, 606–613.
Folbre N (2004) Who Pays for the Kids?:
Gender and the Structures of Constraint.
Routledge, New York.
Foran B, Poldy F (2002) Future Dilemmas.
Options to 2050 for Australia’s Population,
Technology, Resources and Environment.
CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems, Canberra,
Australia.
Gallagher RV, Leishman MR (2014) Invasive
Plants and Invaded Ecosystems in Australia:
Implications for Biodiversity. In: Stow A,
Maclean N, Howell GI (eds) Austral Ark.
The State of Wildlife in Australia and New
Zealand, pp. 105–133. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK.
Getzen TE (1992) Population Aging and the
Growth of Health Expenditures. Journal of
Gerontology 47, S98–S104.
Heard B (2013) Green Freight. Investigations
and Recommendations for Moving Towards
Sustainable Freight in South Australia.
ThinkClimate Consulting, Adelaide.
Heard B, Bradshaw CJA, Brook BW (2015)
Beyond Wind: Furthering Developing of
Clean Energy in South Australia. Transac-
tions of the Royal Society of South
Australia 139, 57–82.
Henman P, Percival R, Harding A, Gray M
(2007) Costs of Children: Research
Commissioned by the Ministerial Taskforce
on Child Support. Australian Government
Department of Families, Community
Services and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra.
Hong S, Bradshaw CJA, Brook BW (2014)
Nuclear Power Can Reduce Emissions and
Maintain a Strong Economy: Rating
Australia’s Optimal Future Electricity-
Generation Mix by Technologies and
Policies. Applied Energy 136, 712–725.
Hong S, Bradshaw CJA, Brook BW (2015)
Global Zero-carbon Energy Pathways Using
Viable Mixes of Nuclear and Renewables.
Applied Energy 143, 451–459.
Hughes TP, Day JC, Brodie J (2015) Securing
the Future of the Great Barrier Reef. Nature
Climate Change 5, 508–511.
International EnergyAgency (2014)Electricity
Information 2014. International Energy
Agency, Paris.
Kolankiewicz L, Camarota SA (2008)
Immigration to the United States and
World-wide Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
Center for Immigration Studies, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Krull CR, Galbraith JA, Glen AS, Nathan HW
(2014) Invasive Vertebrates in Australian
and New Zealand. In: Stow A, Maclean N,
Howell GI (eds) Austral Ark. The State of
Wildlife in Australia and New Zealand, pp.
197–226. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK.
Kwok C-L, Lloyd CJ, Yip PSF (2013) Aging
Population Scenarios: An Australian
263Bradshaw & Brook: Australia’s Population Policy Implications
© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies
published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University andWiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.
Experience. Journal of Population Research
30, 335–345.
Lambers H (2003) Dryland Salinity: A Key
Environmental Issue in Southern Australia.
Plant and Soil 257, 5–7.
Loftus PJ, Cohen AM, Long JCS, Jenkins JD
(2015) A Critical Review of Global
Decarbonization Scenarios: What Do They
Tell Us about Feasibility? Wiley Interdisci-
plinary Reviews: Climate Change 6,
93–112.
Lubcke T (2013) A Review of the Viability of
the Coalition’s “Direct Action Plan”.
newanthropocene.wordpress.com.
Nielsen DL, Brock MA, Rees GN, Baldwin
DS (2003) Effects of Increasing Salinity
on Freshwater Ecosystems in Australia.
Australian Journal of Botany 51, 655–665.
Palmer G (2012) Does Energy Efﬁciency
Reduce Emissions and Peak Demand? A
Case Study of 50Years of Space Heating
in Melbourne. Sustainability 4, 1525–1560.
Pannell DJ (2001) Dryland Salinity: Eco-
nomic, Scientiﬁc, Social and Policy
Dimensions. Australian Journal of
Agricultural and Resource Economics 45,
517–546.
Pitman AJ, Narisma GT, Pielke RA, Holbrook
NJ (2004) Impact of Land Cover Change on
the Climate of SouthwestWestern Australia.
Journal of Geophysical Research-
Atmospheres 109, D18109.
Productivity Commission (2005) Economic
Implications of an Ageing Australia. Pro-
ductivity Commission, Government of
Australia, Canberra.
R Core Team (2014) R: A Language and Envi-
ronment for Statistical Computing. R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna,
Austria.
Reinhardt UE (2003) Does the Aging of the
Population Really Drive the Demand for
Health Care? Health Affairs 22, 27–39.
Roelfsema M, den Elzen M, Höhne N et al.
(2014) Are Major Economies on Track to
Achieve Their Pledges for 2020? An As-
sessment of Domestic Climate and Energy
Policies. Energy Policy 67, 781–796.
Schiermeier Q (2014) Anger as Australia
Dumps Carbon Tax. Nature 511, 392.
Seligman P (2010) Australian Sustainable
Energy – by the Numbers. Melbourne
Energy Institute, Melbourne.
Shahiduzzaman M, Layton A, Alam K (2015)
Decomposition of Energy-related CO2
Emissions in Australia: Challenges and
Policy Implications. Economic Analysis
and Policy 45, 100–111.
Shi A (2003) The Impact of Population
Pressure on Global Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, 1975–1996: Evidence from
Pooled Cross-country Data. Ecological
Economics 44, 29–42.
Shu J, Goldlust J, McKenzie F, Struik A, Khoo
SE (1996) Australia’s Population Trends
and Prospects 1995. Australian Govern-
ment Publishing Service, Canberra.
Simpson G, Clifton J (2014) Consultation,
Participation and Policy-making: Evaluating
Australia’s Renewable Energy Target.
Australian Journal of Public Administration
73, 29–33.
Trainer T (2012) Can Australia Run on
Renewable Energy? The Negative Case.
Energy Policy 50, 306–314.
Turton H, Hamilton C (1999) Population
Growth and Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
Sources, Trends and Projections in
Australia. Discussion Paper Number 26.
The Australia Institute, Canberra.
United Nations (1998) Kyoto Protocol of the
United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change,
Bonn, Germany.
Woinarski JCZ, Burbidge AA, Harrison PL
(2015) Ongoing Unraveling of a Continental
Fauna: Decline and Extinction of Australian
Mammals since European Settlement.
Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the USA 112, 4531–4540.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be
found in the online version of this article at
the publisher’s web site.
Table S1. Solid fossil fuel combustion
emission conversion factors for carbon dioxide
264 Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies May 2016
© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies
published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University andWiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.
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methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O)
(Commonwealth of Australia 2014)
Figure S1. Average age structure of
immigrants to Australia from 2004 to 2013
Figure S2. Australia’s population trajectory
from 1971 to 2014 and scenario-based projec-
tions of its future population from 2015 to
2100. Scenario 7: business-as-usual population
growth (increasing survival and age at ﬁrst
reproduction—Section 2) and net overseas
migration (I04-13 = average of 215,000year
1
from 2004 to 2013); scenario 8: as scenario 7
except with constant (1 per cent of total
population size) immigration (I1%); scenario
9: as scenario 7 except with a linear increase
in immigration rate to twice the average by
2100 (I(04-13) × 2); scenario 10: zero net
overseas (I0); scenario 11: ﬁxed annual net
immigration of 20,000 (I20k); scenario 12:
ﬁxed annual net immigration at 100,000
(I100k). Also shown as reference points are the
projected ﬁnal populations at constant, a
constant growth rate observed between 1971
and 2014 (1.36 per cent, r71-14) and between
2006 and 2014 (1.73 per cent, r06-14)
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